1. INTRODUCTION

For a decade or more the NEO community has striven for a truly international effort to mitigate the NEO threat, but it seems that everyone is happy to let the United States do all of the work. Not only is this grossly unfair, but demonstrates a complacency that is breathtaking.

Perhaps NEOs are not “sexy” any more, and that a much more “politically acceptable” issue is global warming. Maybe we need more female politicians! It is generally recognised that the ladies are better at multi-tasking, and should, therefore, be much more adept at juggling the issues of NEOs and global warming simultaneously! Just because a new hazard presents itself, it doesn’t mean that all of the others suddenly disappear.

2. RECENT UK ACTIVITIES

As a result of events in near Earth space and in the US (and pressure from Spaceguard UK) the British Government established the Task Force on Potentially Hazardous Near Earth Objects in 1999. The subsequent report, published in September 2000, made 14 recommendations. The science minister, Lord Sainsbury, accepted the recommendations. Details of the recommendations can be found at http://www.nearearthobjects.co.uk/report/pdf/full_report.pdf.

In February 2004 Lembit Opik MP tabled 11 parliamentary questions, based on the recommendations of the Task Force on Potentially Hazardous near Earth Objects. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry replied. The Secretary of State's replies made it clear that there are no plans in the UK to do anything substantial about the NEO hazard, other than to raise the issue internationally. This has resulted in agreement from the OECD to investigate the issue, increased interest from ESA and some interest in the UN.

It is, however, difficult to see how her responses can be squared with Lord Sainsbury's statement in the House of Lords on 11 September 2003 when he told their Lordships that:

"So far as I know, all the recommendations have been implemented although there is a question in some cases of finding the funds for the use of the particular telescopes which have been allocated. I shall meet with the task force in October to review the position and to consider the progress made." (Hansard, 11 Sept 2003: Column 472). The most recent update on progress (dated January 2005) can be found at http://www.bnsc.gov.uk/assets/channels/resources/news/Near%20Earth%20Object%20Update%20-%20January%202005.doc.

At an RAeS sponsored conference on NEOs that was held in London in November 2005 the firm impression was given that, as the US was planning the Spaceguard Follow-on Survey (to detect 90% of potentially hazardous NEOs with diameters greater than 140 metres), there was no requirement for substantial action by the UK, and that the recommendations of the UK Task Force had been “largely overtaken by events”.

While the UK’s record of increasing the awareness of the NEO hazard in international forums (UN – the UK leads COPUOS AT-14, OECD) – driven mainly by the BNSC - has been commendable, there has been a marked lack of actual action. Typically the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Global Science Forum Workshop on Near Earth Objects: Risks, Policies and Actions, held in January 2003 in Frascati, Italy published a final report that made implicit recommendations, but no firm direction. The report can be found at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/40/2503992.pdf. It is mildly interesting to note that the meeting was hosted by the Spaceguard Foundation, and, as a member of the SGF Board of Directors, I had intended to attend (at my own expense). However, the UK delegation vetoed my attendance and kicked up such a fuss that, to maintain some UK dignity, I decided not to go. The SGF president, Andrea Carusi, only attended under protest.

The National Space Centre in Leicester maintains a small exhibition and a website, but the distributive element of the National Near Earth Information Centre has failed to materialise. There have been limited observation programmes (Fitzsimmons et al.), a study into mitigation strategies that is being undertaken at the University of Glasgow (Radice et al.), and research is under way at the University of Southampton to assess the global threat to Earth posed by small NEOs.

In the UK’s national report to UN COPUOS in March 2006 the privately funded Spaceguard Centre was cited as the primary source of public information in the country.

3. RECENT US ACTIVITIES

In a 1992 report to NASA, a coordinated Spaceguard Survey was recommended to discover, verify and provide follow-up observations for Earth-crossing asteroids. This survey was expected to discover 90% of these objects larger than one kilometre within 25 years. Three years later, another NASA report recommended search surveys that would discover 60-70% of short-period, near-Earth objects larger than one kilometre within ten years and obtain 90% completeness within five more years.

In 1998, NASA formally embraced the goal of finding and cataloguing, by 2008, 90% of all near-Earth objects (NEOs) with diameters of 1 km or larger that could represent a collision risk to Earth. The 1 km diameter metric was chosen after considerable study indicated that an impact of an object smaller than 1 km could cause significant local or regional damage but is unlikely to cause a worldwide catastrophe. The impact of an object much larger than 1 km diameter could well result in worldwide damage up to, and potentially including, extinction of the human race. The NASA commitment has resulted in the funding of a number of NEO search efforts that are making considerable progress toward the 90% goal by 2008.

Over the past few years, there have been several meetings of world experts on this topic. The 2004 Planetary Defense Conference was held beginning on 23 February 2004 to discuss detection, deflection, policy, law, and disaster preparedness. There was a follow-up 2007 Planetary Defense Conference, held from 5-8 March 2007 in Washington, D.C. that also addressed similar issues.

The first step in defending against Near-Earth objects is detection and threat analysis. There are several world-wide programs for detection. Most of these programs are currently (as of early 2007) by NASA's Near Earth Object (NEO) program office as part of their Spaceguard programs.

U.S. House of Representatives' bill, H.R. 1022, The George E. Brown, Jr. Near-Earth Object Survey Act, was introduced in March 2005 by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher "to provide for a Near-Earth Object Survey program to detect, track, catalogue, and characterize certain near-earth asteroids and comets". It was eventually rolled into S.1281, the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. The following text became law as part of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 passed by the Congress on 22 December 2005, and subsequently signed by the President.

The U.S. Congress has declared that the general welfare and security of the United States require that the unique competence of NASA be directed to detecting, tracking, cataloguing, and characterizing near-Earth asteroids and comets in order to provide warning and mitigation of the potential hazard of such near-Earth objects to the Earth.

The NASA Administrator shall plan, develop, and implement a Near-Earth Object Survey program to detect, track, catalogue, and characterize the physical characteristics of near- Earth objects equal to or greater than 140 meters in diameter in order to assess the threat of such near-Earth objects to the Earth. It shall be the goal of the Survey program to achieve 90% completion of its near-Earth object catalogue (based on statistically predicted populations of near-Earth objects) within 15 years after the date of enactment of this Act.

The NASA Administrator shall transmit to Congress not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act an initial report that provides the following:

(A) An analysis of possible alternatives that NASA may employ to carry out the Survey program, including ground-based and space-based alternatives with technical descriptions.

(B) A recommended option and proposed budget to carry out the Survey program pursuant to the recommended option.

(C) Analysis of possible alternatives that NASA could employ to divert an object on a likely collision course with Earth.

The result of this directive was a report presented to Congress in early March 2007. This was an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) study led by NASA's Program Analysis and Evaluation office with support from outside consultants, the Aerospace Corporation, NASA Langley Research Center, and SAIC (amongst others). A copy of the report can be found at http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/neo/neoreport030825.pdf.

4. THE CURRENT SITUATION

At present the situation in the US is unclear. NASA has insisted on keeping the full text of their report confidential, claiming that it is a “working document”. However, a copy can be found at http://www.b612foundation.org/papers/NASA-finalrpt.pdf. What NASA is intending to do to comply with S.1281, the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 has yet to be announced, and whether Congress intends to increase NASA funding to cover the proposed project is equally unclear. Independent organisations such as the B612 Foundation are actively trying to clarify the situation, and some fairly robust discussions are in progress.

Communications with the key players at NASA indicate that international participation in the follow-on survey and assistance with other aspects of the project would be most welcome. However, it is essential that the US indicates in which areas international assistance would be most beneficial, and that the international community expresses a demonstrable willingness to provide practical assistance.

The UK has already made its own study into the issue, and is well aware of the requirements. It is also active in encouraging other nations and organisations to take an interest. However, after nearly a decade of discussion there is still little prospect of a co-ordinated, practical international response to the NEO hazard. Despite the scientific consensus, the mass of empirical evidence, widespread acceptance of the severity of the threat and the near unanimous agreement of international organisations as to the need for action the only nation playing an active role in mitigating the NEO hazard remains the United States. This is not due to any desire by the US to monopolise the field, but to the lack of willingness to take practical action elsewhere.

5. SOME PRACTICAL STEPS THAT THE UK COULD LEAD

a. General.

The 14 recommendations of the Task Force are still totally relevant. Any practical progress on implementation would send a clear signal to the US and the international community that the time for discussion is past, and co-ordinated international action is required.

An argument against such action that has been raised on a number of occasions is that the UK should not duplicate efforts being made by the US. However, this misses the point that NEO detection and follow-up are cumulative in nature – the more resources used, the more effective the project. It is a similar situation to a military operation – the more resources deployed, the higher the prospects of success (UK support for the US in Iraq for example).

There is, however, an essential difference between appearing to do something and actually doing it.

b. MPC Funding

The Minor Planet Center's funding is declining asits workload increases. The bulk of its money has traditionally come from subscriptions to its publications of asteroid data. But with the transformation from printed to electronic publishing, fewer research institutions, libraries and individual astronomers are willing to pay for the data. NASA provides about half of the Center's budget.

c. Detection

It is probable that the main detection effort will remain the responsibility of the US. The detailed studies and experience of NEO detection put the US in a unique position to dominate the field. However, their programme could be substantially improved were they not diverting funding to other areas that could be taken up by international partners. However, it would be possible to develop a robust and highly effective detection system to complement US projects by providing a network of short focal length 3-metre class telescopes. The optimal number would be six – three in the northern hemisphere and three in the southern. The total project cost (~ £120 M) would be significantly less than the sum reserved for the press and media centre for the 2012 Olympic Games (£134 M).

d. Follow-up

Although some of the major detection systems are capable of doing their own immediate follow-up observations, there is still a critical requirement for astrometric observations. Most of this work is currently being done by amateurs and volunteers around the world, but such assets will not be capable of observing smaller NEOs. The most capable follow-up project at the moment is the Faulkes telescope Project (now part of the LCOGT) that uses robotic 2-metre class telescopes, and invaluable astrometric data is being collected by UK school children. There are two possibilities for UK support for follow-up programmes:

i. The use of UK telescope assets for NEO astrometry and photometry (as recommended by the Task Force).

ii. The encouragement of amateur observers by the provision of grants or technical assistance.

e. Mitigation

A study into deflection techniques is underway at Glasgow University. However, the implementation of any deflection effort will require resources available only to the US, Russia, possibly China or ESA. It would be prudent to remember the wise advice that “unless you’ve practiced it, you can’t do it”. The UK can perform a valuable service by encouraging ESA to conduct missions to NEOs and to plan for deflection scenarios, and by supporting UK industry in the development of spacecraft for the purpose.

6. SUMMARY

It has become increasingly clear over the past decade that the NEO issue is the only natural hazard that we face that has the potential to directly affect every individual on the planet; indeed it is the only one that puts the existence of our species at risk. However, it has also become clear that we no longer have to live under this threat – it can be effectively addressed with existing technology and a modicum of willpower.

The funding required to effectively address the NEO threat is significant, but when compared to the inevitable cost of inaction, and the resources devoted to other issues (military operations in Iraq, the Millennium Dome, the 2012 Olympic Games, wastage in Tax Credits, global warming etc., etc.) it is of minor consequence. The problem in acquiring the required level of funding has nothing to do with logical analysis, but with political expediency, and that is invariably a poor basis for long-term decision making.

The current NEO situation can be likened to the US attitude to the threat of international terrorism prior to 11 September 2001; few resources, lack of political interest and complacency. But then it happens ………….